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ABSTRACT
FIRM ENTRY, CREDIT SHOCKS AND BUSINESS
CYCLES
KARASOY, Hatice Go¨kc¸e
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
September 2012
In this thesis, we investigate whether, modelling firm dynamics together with
credit markets in a two country frame, can provide additional information on
international real business cycles in matching certain moments and explain
other stylized statistics on business entry. Our motivation is the fact that, in
the latest financial crisis, firm entry behavior is quite different between high
income and low income countries. Solution of the model is provided with
both productivity and credit shocks. Both kinds of shocks match a subset
of stylized international business cycle facts. Plus in both kinds of shocks
model exhibits the fact that volatility of new entrant firms are higher than
incumbent ones. We show that credit shocks are better at explaining highly
volatile business cycles in financially less developed countries. In the existence
of country-specific credit shocks we observe contagion of crisis, comovements
across countries do only exist with global credit shocks. We find out that the
firm entry behaviour seen in latest financial crisis that financially developed
countries has more volatile firm entry, is only possible with global shocks.
Keywords: Endogenous Firm Entry, Finance of Firms, Real Business Cycles
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O¨ZET
FI˙RMA GI˙RI˙S¸I˙, KREDI˙ S¸OKLARI VE REEL
DEVREVI˙ HAREKETLER
KARASOY, Hatice Go¨kc¸e
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
Eylu¨l 2012
Bu tez firma dinamiklerinin kredi piyasaları ile etkiles¸imini modellemekte ve
bu tes¸ebbu¨su¨n firma giris¸i istatistikleri ile uluslararası devresel hareketleri
ac¸ıklamadaki bas¸arısını o¨lc¸meyi amac¸lamaktadır. Temel motivasyonumuz,
son ku¨resel finansal krizde firma giris¸inin, yu¨ksek ve du¨s¸u¨k-gelir grubun-
daki u¨lkelerde farklı davranmasıdır. Modelin c¸o¨zumu¨ hem u¨retkenlik s¸okları
ile hem de kredi s¸okları ile incelenmis¸tir. Her iki s¸ok tu¨ru¨ de go¨zlenen
uluslararası devresel hareketlerin bir kısmını sergilemektedir. Ayrıca her iki
s¸ok tu¨ru¨nde de yeni giren firma sayısı, zaten var olanlara go¨re daha c¸ok
dalgalanmaktadır. Kredi s¸okları, finansal olarak daha az gelis¸mis¸ u¨lkelerin
daha c¸ok dalgalanan devresel hareketlere sahip oldug˘unu ac¸ıklamakta daha
bas¸arılıdır. Kredi s¸okları tek bir u¨lkeye o¨zgu¨ oldug˘unda, kriz bulas¸ıcılıg˘ı
go¨zlemlenirken, es¸anlı kriz, ortak kredi s¸oklarının varlıg˘ında mu¨mku¨n ol-
maktadır. Son olarak, finansal krizde go¨zlemlenen, finansal olarak gelis¸mis¸
u¨lkelerin daha c¸ok dalgalanan firma giris¸ine sahip olmasının yalnızca ku¨resel
kredi s¸okları ile mu¨mku¨n olabileceg˘ini iddia edilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Endojen Firma Giris¸i, Reel Devrevi Hareketler
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The international business cycle literature investigates comovements in ag-
gregate variables across countries usually relying on dynamic models with
productivity shocks. These models mostly investigate comovements between
aggregate variables such as GDP, consumption, investment and the relation
between net exports and exchange rates. Findings of these papers verify the
existence of both global and country-specific shocks in shaping both the with-
in country cycles and international comovements (see for example, Boileau et
al. (2010), Glick and Rogoff(1993), and Kose et al. (2003) among others).
With a few exceptions the models rarely attempt to include firm dynamics
1 to their models. The usual perception is that using a representative firm
framework without any dynamics in the market may represent the real econ-
omy, and key macroeconomic variables quite well. However, of those that take
into account firm dynamics Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model a two-country
1Although ′′firm dynamics′′ may capture different aspects about the distribution of firms
in their expansion/contractions, entry/exit decisions or changes in age structure, this paper
is specifically interested in ”firm entry”. Literature verifies the place of entry in business
cycles. For example, Lewis (2006) and Devereux et al.(1996) show that entry is procyclical
and tends to lead output by one quarter, and similar to capital investment, entry and
net entry are more volatile than output over cycle. Moreover, firm entry behaviour can
capture important characteristics. For example, the number of producing firms can tell a
lot about the market structure, competition, product variety; and the comparison between
the number of new entrant firms and already-producing firms can tell the age distribution
of firms.
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world with heterogeneous firms and study dynamics of international trade and
macroeconomic variables, concluding that firm entries and entry costs are im-
portant mechanisms for transmission of productivity shocks. They provide
an endogenous, micro founded explanation for a Harrod Balassa-Samuelson
effect in response to aggregate productivity differentials and deregulation in
an IRBC frame. Again with including endogenous firm entry Bilbiie et al.
(2012) present an RBC model that does at least as good as the standard
RBC model at matching US economy moments, plus their model explains
procylicality of entry. Auray and Eyquem (2011), build a two country DSGE
model with both real and monetary policy shocks; aiming match international
business cycle statistics, and documenting the important role played by firm
dynamics, sticky prices, and financial market incompleteness.
Reliance solely on technology (or productivity) shocks in explaining busi-
ness cycles has become questionable in the light of latest financial crisis.
Recent studies have indeed documented evidence pointing to the similarly
significant role played by credit shocks in explaining business cycles. For
example Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) claim that especially in crisis times
the source of volatility is mainly credit shocks. Furthermore Christiano et
al. (2010) verify that financial shocks explain fluctuations not only for cri-
sis periods but also for longer periods. Plus, Jermann and Quadrini (2009)
build a general equilibrium model and shows that financial shocks together
with productivity shocks match the dynamics of US real and financial vari-
ables moments much better than the model only with productivity shocks. In
most of these papers financial markets are modelled to only include primary
financial institutions, such as banks, whereas the role played by secondary
financial institutions such as the stock market, is also of great importance.
To the best of our knowledge most of these papers model financial shocks,
while not accounting for firm dynamics, despite the documentation of the role
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of such financial shocks in firm entry/exit decisions (see for example Arellano
et al. (2009)). In this paper, we model not only productivity shocks but
also credit/financial shocks in an environment where both kinds of financial
institutions; banks and the stock market exist for the finance of firms.
One of the main motivations of this paper is the World Bank report:
“Entrepreneur Snapshots 2010: Measuring The Impact of the Financial Crisis
on New Business Registration”. This report documents differences in density
of firm entry between high income and low income countries during the latest
crisis period, pointing out that density of firm entry is highly correlated to
financial development. These countries can also be identified respectively as
financially developed and financially less developed countries. 2 The World
Bank defines density of new business entry as the number of newly registered
limited liability companies per 1,000 working age (1564) people 3
Figure 1.1: World Bank Entrepreneur Snapshots 2010
2The World Bank presents firm entry statistics in the mentioned report and analyzes
firm entry behaviour across countries using these terms (high income-financially developed,
low/middle income-financially less developed interchangeably)
3We are well aware that, this analysis uses annually data. Since The World Bank collects
firm entry data annually, while this may seem inconsistent with a business cycle research
motivation, we do think that if the data were collected quarterly the volatility difference
between high-income (financially developed) and low-income (financially less developed)
countries would stay similar
3
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 provides some basic statistics. As it is evident
in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 at all data points high income (financially
developed) countries have higher entry density. Figure 2 shows in the latest
financial crisis, high income (middle income) countries experienced a more
volatile (less volatile) entry density. For low income countries it is almost
constant. The correlation between financial development and entry density
can be seen in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.2: World Bank Entrepreneur Snapshots 2010
The relation between firm entry and finance has been studied frequently
by empirical researchers. For example, Aghion et al. (2007) investigate firm
entry and expansion of firms after entry focusing on financial development and
credit constraints, using firm level data. They found size-dependent results as
follows; access to finance matters especially for the small firms while for the
large firms financial development seem to have no or minor effect. Considering
new entrant firms usually have smaller size compared to incumbent firms Gil
(2009); empirical studies tell us that mostly small and new entrant (young)
firms suffer from credit contractions and they are also the first ones who
gain from credit booms. For example, Beck et al. (2008) find that small
firm industries take advantage from financial development before large firm
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industries. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) empirically analyze the
effect of stock market development on firm’s financing choices and conclude
that small firms do not seem to be affected by stock market developments.
This study may be seen as a reflection of the fact that small firms usually
finance via private equity or credit markets. Berger and Udell (1998) show
that smaller and younger firms tend to rely on initial insider finance and trade
credit. As the firm grows it uses venture capital, bank and finance companies
channels. In the final stage of growth the firm eventually accesses to public
equity and debt markets. Moreover, Weinberg (1994) and Watson and Wilson
(2002) verify that younger firms pay lower dividends and are more reliant on
debt finance.
Figure 1.3: World Bank Entrepreneur Snapshots 2010
To summarize, the empirical regularities that motivate our study and we
expect to reflect in our model are as follows;
• The financially developed countries tend to have a more volatile density
of firm entry (with the available data).
• The correlation between entry density and financial development is sig-
nificantly positive.
• Smaller and younger firms (loosely new entrants) benefit more from
improvements in financing channels,. 4
4In the remainder of the paper, we mainly focus on the age of the firm (new entrant
5
• In the absence of private equity, younger firms use credit channels,
whereas older firms can access stock and debt markets.
• Young firms tend to pay less amounts of dividend in the stock markets.
Keeping all these empirical regularities in mind, the last financial crisis can
be thought as an important credit shock on both financially developed and
less developed countries, as the literature suggests (see for example Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2010) and Kose et al. (2010)). Of course, this shock did not
influence all countries equally; the conventional wisdom suggests the crisis
emerged in high-income countries and other countries were affected from the
crisis via several transmission channels. As Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010)
document other countries (especially emerging markets) were affected from
the crisis, mainly via three lending channels. These channels include (1)
contraction in cross-border lending by foreign banks, (2) contraction in local
lending by affiliates of foreign banks in emerging markets and (3) contraction
in lending supply by domestic banks resulting from funding shock to their
balance sheet. The strength of the global shock depends on how much these
channels are active.
Kose et al. (2010) examine the importance of credit market shocks in
driving global business cycles, and conclude that credit shocks originating
in the US have an significant effect on the evolution of world growth during
global recessions. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) empirically show that when
the productivity shocks are the main source of fluctuations more financial
integration results in less synchronized business cycles, however, if the credit
shocks are the dominant source of fluctuations then more financial integra-
tion results in more synchronized business cycles. They claim also that the
countries with more direct and indirect links to the US financial system ex-
or not), without taking into account size differences. The fact that small firms are usually
the younger ones, the regularity is in accordance with our model.
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perienced more synchronized cycles during the last crisis. The literature on
synchronization is actually indeed very large. For example, Frankel and Rose
(1998) show the importance of trade channels, Imbs (2006) points out the
importance of financial linkages. Besides these, Altug et al. (2012) document
the importance of institutional characteristics for synchronization.
Recently, there is a boom in the number of articles that incorporate en-
dogenous entry into macro DSGE models together with different kinds of
market forms. In the theoretical macro literature these dynamics are either
modelled; as heterogeneous firms with respect to productivity or as firms in
a monopolistically competitive market, while with imposing an equilibrium
condition for entry using entry costs. Imposing firm heterogeneity mostly
follows Melitz (2003). Taking cue from the latter modelling of firm dynamics,
one of most relevant papers for this study is Bilbiie et al. (2012). They build a
very simple real business cycle framework with endogenous firm entry. Their
main conclusion is that their model is at least as good as the base real business
cycle models plus it is able to explain the procyclical number of entrants and
countercyclical mark-ups. Since they use monopolistic competition in their
model, they accept a broader definition of entry capturing product creation
relying on the fact that new product creation is also strongly procylical. Plus,
the model has a steady state in which share of profits in capital is constant
and there is a positive correlation between the share of investment and share
of profits.
Furthermore Bilbiie et al. (2012) model financing intermediation for firms
via only stock market, and use the stock price as a propagation mechanism
in the model. They do not include any other financing channel in the model.
Later Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010) use the same baseline model, extending
it to a two country frame where firms are financed via only banks. They
show that if one country’s banking system’s monopoly power declines, then
7
that country experiences an increase in the producer number, appreciation
of local currency and current account deficit. Arellano et al. (2009) build a
general equilibrium model, based on bank lending, to show that differences
in financial development do capture the differences in growth rates between
firms of different size. They model financial development with a credit cost
factor.
So, we mainly ask, including “firm entry” together with financial devel-
opment differences in a business cycle model explain business cycle and new
business formation facts across countries when the model is simulated with
productivity and credit shocks? As we stated earlier, this paper builds a
DSGE model that incorporates endogenous firm entry as the propagation
mechanism of fluctuations when credit shocks as well as productivity shocks
are due. So different than the DSGE model constructed in Kalemli-Ozcan et
al. (2012) we take into account firm dynamics and in our model the source
of the shock matters by means of global and country specific chocks as its
importance is shown by Kose et al. (2010). In our set-up firms compete in
monopolistic competition fashion and there are sunk entry costs to enter the
market. Firms are either financed via perfectly competitive banks or fully
efficient stock markets. All producing firms are engaged in trade with melt-
ing iceberg trade costs, in both countries. The finance choice is not left to
firms; instead, new firms have to borrow from banks for making up their sunk
entry cost; and once they paid their loan back in the following period, they
start to issue stocks in the stock market. Firms that are paying their loan
back to banks do not distribute dividends to households. Individuals take
dividends only from remaining producing firms. Producing firms issue stock
in the stock market, plus in each period they have to borrow a constant share
of their labor costs from banks. Since this is a two country open economy
model, households can freely hold deposits in both countries’ banks. So the
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model captures both trade and financial channels across countries. Based
on the fact that high income countries and low income countries differ sub-
stantially in their financial development level, to analyze endogenous entry
we focus the difference in financial development level between two countries
keeping everything else symmetric.
Financial development is captured via the variable lending cost,5, that
banks have to bear when they lend to firms. That cost will be a combination
of country-specific and global components. The global component is common
for all countries; the country-specific component, on the other hand, is the one
that identifies financial development of a country. The processes for global
and country specific components are estimated from data. We will present
responses of aggregate variables to orthogonalized shocks to both country-
specific productivity and global and country-specific credit shocks.
Solving the model both with productivity and credit shocks we show that
both shocks are able to match a subset of international business cycle statis-
tics. Plus in both kinds of shocks, the volatility of new entrant firms is higher
than the volatility of incumbent ones, as the mentioned literature expects.
Different than productivity shocks, credit shocks also reveals the fact that
financially less developed countries have more volatile business cycles com-
pared to financially developed ones. Plus, when business cycles are driven by
credit shocks, the model also exhibits the empirical fact that financially less
developed countries have more correlated consumption and GDP and also
more correlated investment and GDP. If we restrict the model to work with
only global shocks, or specify country-specific shocks being equal, the model
also matches higher volatility of firm entry in high-income (financially) devel-
oped countries. However we doubt that this is a business cycle fact; because
imposing the shocks as the real data suggests the volatility of new entrants
5Actually this lending cost can be named as monitoring cost, or risk factor which is
simply the cost creates difference between deposit rate and lending rate.
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also seem to be higher in less financially developed countries. This is mainly
because of the fact that, historically these countries face credit shocks that
have larger variances. Since we have very limited entry data across coun-
tries, we do not have a chance to look at what the real data suggests about
the differences in volatility of entry between high income and low income
countries.
In our set-up responses to productivity shocks are not symmetric. When
there is shock to either country, both countries increase their consumption.
When the source of the productivity shock is home country, aggregate vari-
ables’ in foreign country behave exactly same as corresponding aggregate
variables in home country. However when the source of the productivity
shock is foreign country this is not the case. In such a case, the GDP of home
country decreases! Investment, number of producing firms, number of new
entrants and labour first fall below their steady state level but then increase.
Responses to country-specific credit shocks, on the other hand, are symmet-
ric and we see the contagion of country-specific crisis after some periods,
in variables, consumption, investment, labour supply, number of producing
firms and new entrants. If the credit shock is not country-specific but instead
global then we observe a synchronized recession. While both countries have
decline in their consumption and output, financially developed country ini-
tially experiences a current account deficit which later turns to a surplus. For
the less financially developed country the reverse argument is valid. Looking
at annual but not quarterly data, real data matches with this proposition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 provides the solution of the model, presenting, steady state, calibration
and impulse responses and comparison of second moments with literature.
Section 4 summarizes the findings and conclude for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL AND MODEL SOLUTION
2.1 THE MODEL
The model is a two-country DSGE model which is heavily influenced by
Bilbiie et al. (2012) and Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010). These two countries
are symmetric in their every aspect except for their bank’s lending costs
which are exposed to global and country specific shocks. In the model all
contracts and prices are written in nominal terms, prices are flexible; so we
will only solve for real variables. Since they are symmetric, we will explain
the model from home country’s perspective, foreign country’s economy will
follow similarly with stars for their corresponding variables.
2.1.1 Household Preferences and Intertemporal Choices
Just as in Bilbiie et al. (2012) both economies are populated by unit mass
of identical households. Labor markets are competitive so for nominal wage
rate Wt representative home household maximizes expected intertemporal
utility;
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tU(Cs, Ls) (2.1)
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where Ct denotes consumption, Lt denotes labor supplied by consumer at
time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor.
The period utility function takes the form:
U(Ct, Lt) = lnCt − χL1+
1
ϕ
t /(1 +
1
ϕ
) (2.2)
where χ > 0 and ϕ ≥ 0 are the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to wages and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply respectively.
Households consume the basket of goods Ct defined over a continuum of
goods Ω for time t. The preferences are in CES form as in Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). There are no non-traded goods in the economy, however there is a
home bias in the preferences as in Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010). Household’s
consumption basket Ct is consisting of two sub baskets; CD,t which denotes
the sub-basket of traded goods those produced at home, and CM,t denoting
sub-basket of traded goods produced in foreign country. So for θ > 1 being
the symmetric elasticity of substitution across sub-baskets, Ct can be written
as follows;
Ct =
(
ν1/θ(CD,t)
θ−1
θ + (1− ν)1/θ(CM,t) θ−1θ
) θ
θ−1
Here ν is the positive parameter of home bias, measuring weight of home
sub-basket in the overall home consumption basket; ν > 1/2 captures home
bias. In the CES formulation CD,t and CM,t are;
CD,t =
(∫
ω∈Ω cD,t(ω)
θ−1/θdω
)θ/θ−1
CM,t =
(∫
ω∗∈Ω∗ cF,t(ω
∗)θ−1/θdω∗
)θ/θ−1
Here, θ again is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across individual
goods, and at any given time t only a subset of home goods Ωt ⊂ Ω and
foreign goods Ω∗t ⊂ Ω is available to home and foreign households.
We denote PD,t and PM,t for the home currency price indexes respectively
for home and foreign sub-baskets and assume export prices are denominated
in the currency of target country. Then the consumption-based price index
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for home country is;
Pt =
(
ν(PD,t)
1−θ + (1− ν)(PM,t)1−θ
) 1
1−θ
Sub-basket prices will follow similarly, denoting pD,t(ω) and p
∗
X,t(ω
∗) for
home currency prices of home and foreign goods;
PD,t =
(∫
ω∈Ωt pD,t(ω)
1−θdω
)1/1−θ
PM,t =
(∫
ω∗∈Ω∗t p
∗
X,t(ω
∗)1−θdω∗
)1/1−θ
So the demand for each home and foreign variety will be;
cD,t(ω) = ν
(
pD,t(ω)
Pt
)−θ
Ct
cM,t(ω
∗) = (1− ν)
(
p∗X,t(ω
∗)
Pt
)−θ
Ct
And finally define relative domestic and export prices;
ρD,t(ω) =
pD,t(ω)
Pt
ρX,t(ω) =
pX,t(ω)
P ∗t
Assuming there are Nt variety producers in home country and N
∗
t variety
produces in foreign country, one can rewrite price index equation as;
(
νNt(ρD,t)
1−θ + (1− ν)N∗t (ρ∗X,t)1−θ
)
= 1 (2.3)
When we specify preferences in CES form the mark-up (µt = θ/(θ − 1)) is
independent from number of firms producing in the market (so the number
of goods).
2.1.2 Production and Pricing
There is a continuum of firms, each producing a different variety ω ∈ Ω in
a monopolistic competition environment. Production requires only one factor
labor, following Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010). Aggregate labor productivity
is denoted as Zt. Each firm is producing yt(ω) = Ztlt(ω) where lt(ω) is
the amount of labor that firm ω hires for production. Unit production cost,
measured in home consumption basket Ct is wt/Zt. Trade is not costless
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there is melting iceberg trade cost τt ≥ 1. We denote consumption based real
exchange rate with Qt showing units of home consumption basket per unit of
foreign consumption basket, that is actually Qt = ε
P ∗t
Pt
, ε being the nominal
exchange rate. Then the previously defined relative prices will be as follows;
ρD,t(ω) = µ
wt
Zt
ρX,t(ω) = µ
wt
Zt
τQ−1
Private equity is not allowed in the model. To enter the market, prospec-
tive firms have to borrow fe,t amounts of labor which is equivalently fe,twt/Zt
amounts of home consumption basket from banks. A new entrant firm at
time t, borrows Ht =
fE,twt
Zt
amounts of consumption good to make up its
entry cost and repays it with the same interest rate, qt, Entry to the market
is endogenous, whereas, exit is exogenous induced by a death rate δ. At each
period NE,t number of firms enter to the market and the survival probability
is (1 − δ) for each period, the law of motion for the producing firms can be
written as;
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NE,t−1) (2.4)
Since each producing firm is also exporting, a firm’s profits will come from
domestic sales and foreign sales. It is straightforward to write these profits
respectively;
piD,t = ν
1
θ
Ct(ρD,t)
1−θ
piX,t = (1− ν)Qt 1θC∗t (ρX,t)1−θ
Then total profit that firm ω makes,
dt = piD,t + piX,t
In our set-up, the producing firms are financed by both the stock markets
and banks. It is assumed that at each period producing firms need to borrow
ψ portion of their costs, in the same sense as Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012)
and Neumeyer and Perri (2005). Next period they will repay this amount
with interest rate qt. It can be easily shown that the total cost that each firm
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bears each period is (θ − 1)dt.
If a firm enters to the market at time t, it will only start producing at
time t+1 due to sunk entry cost and one period lag to produce. At time t+1
the firm will start to produce and also pay its loan back to bank. Plus the
firm now able to supply its shares to stock market, noting consumers decide
on which firms to finance in one period advance. So at time t+1 the firm will
have stock value; however it will not able to distribute dividends. Then, at
time period t, Nt−1(1− δ) number of firms distribute dividends, NE,t−1(1− δ)
number of firms are experiencing their first period of production and repaying
their loans and issuing stock and again taking loans for the next period’s
cost. Dividend amount for each firm then will be equal to total profits minus
payments of borrowings.
Then, total dividend payment that goes to households is;
TDt = Nt−1(1− δ)(dt − (1 + qt−1)ψ(θ − 1)dt−1)
2.1.3 Firm Entry and Banking
The banking sector is perfectly competitive, so we use a representative
bank framework. We assume the banks gather deposits from households,
paying risk-free interest rates (deposit rate in this model is risk free) , and
using the deposits to finance new entrant and producing firms. Since this is
an open economy model, the home bank is also able to collect deposits from
foreign households. At time t, home individuals decide to save as deposit Bt+1
amounts of consumption good in home bank, and foreign individuals make
so B∗t+1 amounts of home consumption good for the next period. (Similarly,
foreign households save as deposit B∗∗,t+1 amounts of foreign consumption
good in foreign banks, home households make so B∗,t+1 amounts of foreign
consumption good.)
15
However, credit market is not fully efficient; there is a lending cost for
new entrant firms which is a fraction of loan borrowed; mtHt or mtψdt(θ−1),
in the next period if the firm survives it will repay this loan with interest
rate qt. Here Ht denotes the entry cost, to be borrowed from banks by new
entrants. If a firm dies without being able to repay its loan, the bank takes
nothing. Home banks will collect deposits from households and repayments of
borrowings from survived firms, It will then make the repayments for bonds
with risk-free interest rate and finance new entrants and producing firms.
Denoting the risk free deposit rate with rt, the flow budget of the bank is as
follows;
Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1 + (1 + qt−1)(1− δ) (Ht−1NE,t−1 + ψ(θ − 1)dt−1Nt−1) =
(1 +mt) (HtNE,t + ψ(θ − 1)dtNt) + (1 + rt)(Bt +B∗t )
Also imposing the additional constraint (perfectly competitive banks are
making zero profit, just financing new entrants with bond investments) which
is, Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1 = (1 +mt) [HtNE,t + ψ(θ − 1)dtNt] we reach the equation for
determination of lending rate1, qt;
1 + qt =
(1 + rt+1)(1 +mt)
1− δ (2.5)
In the literature there is no obvious way to model the functional form
of lending cost, consisting of global and country-specific components. The
same argument is valid also for productivity shocks. To investigate common
and country specific productivity shocks, Glick and Rogoff (1993) used the
functional form of At = A
W
t A
C
t where A
W
t stands for world components, A
C
t
stands for country specific component. Whereas Boileau et al. (2010) pre-
ferred summation for productivity processes and modelled total productivity
1If we embed bank’s constraint into households’ budget constraint and let the household
decide which new entrants should be financed we would reach the equivalent result, that is
quite intuitive keeping in mind banks are perfectly competitive and households own them.
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as At = A
W
t + A
C
t .
We model lending cost as mt = (e
st − e−gt) for home country and m∗t =
(es
∗
t−e−gt) for foreign country, clearly gt is the common global component and
st and s
∗
t are the country specific components. One reason for this functional
form is that we want adding global component to lending cost should decrease
it, because as Buch et al. (2005) states financial openness leads to financial
improvement in terms of this kind of costs. At the same time the country is
expected to become open to global shocks (So the derivative of m with respect
to g should be positive). 2 The global and country specific components have
the following reduced form representation such that ut, εt and ε
∗
t are i.i.d.
Plus, since they are estimated with an reduced form VAR, this also provides
boundaries for used functional form.
gt
st
s∗t
 =

gd
sd
s∗d
+

γ φ1 φ2
φ3 κ φ4
φ5 φ6 κ
∗


gt−1
st−1
s∗t−1
+

ut
εt
ε∗t
 (2.6)
Free Entry Condition:
The free entry condition will specify, if a firm decides to enter this period
whether in the next period its value (which is actually the sum of future
discounted profits) plus its period-profit is higher or equal than its loan re-
payment amount. The equilibrium imposes;
F.E.C. : Et(dt+1 + vt+1) = (1 + qt)Ht (2.7)
2The model’s implications are robust for all functional forms we have tried satisfying
mentioned properties. We have chosen this one because of its simplicity.
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2.1.4 Households’ Intertemporal Optimization
In this model households only finance producing firms via stock markets.
They do not prefer to finance new entrants who are in their investment pro-
cess, having one period lag to produce.
Hence, the household’s period budget constraint will be as follows in terms
of consumption good;
Bt+1 +QtB∗,t+1 +
η
2
B2t+1 +
η
2
QtB
2
∗,t+1 + vtNtxt+1 +Ct = (1 + rt)Bt + (1 +
r∗t )QtB∗,t + T
f
t + wtLt + xtNt−1(1− δ)(dt + vt − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + qt−1)dt−1)
Considering the above explanation, the households can take dividend pay-
ment and sales revenues from stock shares only from Nt−1(1 − δ) number of
firms. In addition xt+1 denotes the fraction of producing firms that house-
hold decides to invest at time t, and vt is the value of the firm such that
transactions in the stock market made at this price.
Households can freely hold both domestic and foreign deposits, with bear-
ing holding costs. η
2
B2t+1 and
η
2
QtB
2
∗,t+1 are symmetric deposit holding costs.
These holdings costs are equal to T ft in equilibrium.
Household will decide, how much to consume, how much to supply labor,
how much to hold deposits in domestic and foreign banks, and finally how
much to invest in stock shares. Solving household’s intertemporal problem
with respect to his budget constraint, first order conditions will appear as 3;
C−1t (1 + ηBt+1) = β(1 + rt+1)Et
[
C−1t+1
]
(2.8)
C−1t (1 + ηB∗,t+1) = β(1 + r
∗
t+1)Et
[
Qt+1
Qt
C−1t+1
]
(2.9)
χL
1/ϕ
t =
wt
Ct
(2.10)
3We assume deposit holdings and risk free deposit rates are predetermined variables as
in Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010), so they do not appear in “expected” values.
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vt = Et
{
β(1− δ)(Ct+1
Ct
)−1 (dt+1 + vt+1 − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + qt)dt)
}
(2.11)
2.1.5 Equilibrium, Aggregate Accounting and Labor
Market
First, deposit market equilibrium conditions imply;
Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1 = (1 +mt) [HtNE,t + ψ(θ − 1)dtNt] (2.12)
B∗,t+1 +B∗∗,t+1 = (1 +m
∗
t )
[
H∗tN
∗
E,t + ψ(θ − 1)d∗tN∗t
]
(2.13)
Aggregating households’ budget constraints with imposing equilibrium
conditions xt = xt+1 = 1 (because of uncertainty the households will invest
all firms that issue stock in stock market), we obtain the following aggregate
accounting identity;
Bt+1 +QtB∗,t+1 +vtNt+Ct = (1+rt)Bt+(1+r∗t )QtB∗,t+wtLt+ Nt−1(1−
δ)(dt + vt − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + qt−1)dt−1)
The foreign country’s aggregate accounting identity will follow similarly;
B∗∗,t+1+
1
Qt
B∗t+1+v
∗
tN
∗
t +C
∗
t = (1+r
∗
t )B
∗
∗,t+(1+rt)
1
Qt
B∗t +w
∗
tL
∗
t +N
∗
t−1(1−
δ)(d∗t + v
∗
t − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + q∗t−1)d∗t−1)
Multiplying foreign households’ accounting identity with real exchange
rate Qt and subtracting from home households’ identity, using constraints of
banks, we reach the law of motion of foreign assets for home country.
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QtB∗,t+1 −B∗t+1 =Qt(1 + r∗t )B∗,t − (1 + rt)B∗t − (1/2)((1 +mt)
(HtNE,t + ψ(θ − 1)Ntdt)−Qt(1 +m∗t )(H∗tN∗E,t+
ψ(θ − 1)N∗t d∗t ))− (1/2)(vtNt −Qtv∗tN∗t )− (1/2)(Ct−
QtC
∗
t ) + (1/2)(wtLt −Qtw∗tL∗t ) + (1/2)((1 + rt)(1 +mt−1)
(Ht−1NE,t−1 + ψ(θ − 1)Nt−1dt−1)−Qt(1 + r∗t )(1 +m∗t−1)
(H∗t−1N
∗
E,t−1 + ψ(θ − 1)N∗t−1d∗t−1)) + (1/2)(Nt−1(1− δ)
(dt + vt − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + qt−1)dt−1)−QtN∗t−1(1− δ)
(d∗t + v
∗
t − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + q∗t−1)d∗t−1))
The Gross Domestic Products for each economy is just equal to the right
or left hand side of aggregated budget balances. Left hand side states GDP
from expenditure side, while right hand side states GDP from income side.
Notice the fact that GDP equals to the sum of consumption and investment
where investment is the sum of stock market investment (vtNt) and bank
investment (Bt+1 +QtB∗,t+1) on firms.
Yt = Bt+1 +QtB∗,t+1 + vtNt + Ct (2.14)
Y ∗t = B
∗
∗,t+1 +
1
Qt
B∗t+1 + v
∗
tN
∗
t + C
∗
t (2.15)
Current account balance of home country is;
CAt = Qt [B∗,t+1 −B∗,t]−
[
B∗t+1 −B∗t
]
(2.16)
The export, import and net export in terms of consumption good for home
country;
EX = QtNt(1− ν)C∗t ρ1−θX,t (2.17)
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IM = N∗t (1− ν)Ctρ∗1−θX,t (2.18)
NX = EX − IM (2.19)
Investment in this economy is the total of investment that goes for new
entrant firm financing, producing firm financing and the stock market finance
of producing firms. So total investment for home country;
I = (1 +mt)(HtNE,t + ψ(θ − 1)dtNt) + vtNt (2.20)
Just like in Bilbiie et al. (2012) and contrary to standard RBC model, this
model embraces two kinds of labor; some of labor will work in the process of
production of consumption good, while rest will work in newly-entrant firms
to complete the one-period investment period before starting production. In
this model there are two types of labor; one part is working in the production
of consumption good while the rest is working in the new entrant firms for
sunk entry cost. Denoting these two types of labor with LCt and L
E
t , it is
clear that;
LCt = Ntlt
LEt =
NE,tfE,t
Zt
LCt + L
E
t = Lt
Labor market equilibrium condition imply;
L =
Nt
wt
(θ − 1)
[
ν
1
θ
(ρ1−θD )Ct + (1− ν)
1
θ
(ρ1−θX,t )C
∗
tQt
]
+NE,t
fe
Z
(2.21)
In the standard RBC model, if labor supply is fixed, since all labor is used
in the production of consumption good, no labor market dynamic will arise.
However in our model as in Bilbiie et al. (2012) even if we fix labor supply,
ϕ = 0, there will be again dynamics in labor market due to the dynamism
arising from endogenous entry. Labor will be allocated between new entrants
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and producing firms for every period.
Model Summary:
Until now we wrote everything from the perspective of home country. For
sure we need to write equilibrium conditions for foreign economy.Overall we
have 46 endogenous variables; wt, w
∗
t , ρD,t, ρ
∗
D,t, ρX,t, ρ
∗
X,t, Nt, N
∗
t , vt, v
∗
t , qt,
q∗t , Ht, H
∗
t , NE,t, N
∗
E,t, dt, d
∗
t , Ct, C
∗
t , Lt, L
∗
t , rt, r
∗
t , Bt, B
∗
t , B∗,t, B
∗
∗,t, Qt, mt,
m∗t , st, s
∗
t , gt. Of them 8 are predetermined; rt, r
∗
t , Bt, B
∗
t , B∗,t, B
∗
∗,t, Nt, N
∗
t .
To save place, world economy is summarized in Table 2 in the Appendix.
2.2 MODEL SOLUTION
2.2.1 Steady State
We present a symmetric steady state of both countries in the case of bal-
anced trade, no bond holding costs and no bond trade. So the steady state
(S.S.) is simply the closed economy steady state replicated for both home and
foreign countries.
Risk free interest rate (which is also deposit rate in this model) given as r
equals to 1−β
β
, in other words β equals to 1
1+r
. Since m and r are exogenous
and δ is a parameters than the lending rate, will be determined as a function
of these; so it is decided exogenously too.
The values of selected variables as a function of parameters at steady state
are available in the Appendix. Using Dynare software the model is approved
to have a numerical steady state when the bond trade and bond holding
costs added, controlled with many different numerical trials for parameters.
Numerical exercise indicates that in steady state current account balances are
0 for both countries and the exchange rate is one.
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2.2.2 Calibration
Since our aim is to focus on financing channels and its affects on business
cycle and firm dynamics, the key parameter for our model is the lending cost.
So taking all the other parameters same for these two countries, but letting
them differ only in their lending cost is an acceptable assumption for now.
So we will take all the parameters same as Bilbiie et al. (2012), which are
actually US parameters.
Since we are actually interested in different firm dynamics and business
cycle implications of high income (financially developed) and low/middle in-
come (less financially developed) countries, the appropriate approach would
be calibrating lending cost capturing these two groups.
However due to the lack of data, we choose two representative countries;
one high-income and one middle income: 4 UK and South Africa to calibrate
the model. There are a few reasons why we have chosen these two coun-
tries. The first reason is they have a long time series data for their lending
premium as US. In accordance with World Bank’s definition, the Financial
Development Report 2011 of the World Economic Forum states the finan-
cial development indexes of UK and South Africa as 5.0 and 3.6 respectively
using a scale from 1 to 7. 5 Their financial development levels differ, but
they are not two very distinct countries. UK is an OECD country, and South
Africa is an enhanced engagement country for the OECD. 6 The entry density
differences of these two countries provided in Figure 2.1.
As stated, to calibrate the US parameters we follow mainly Bilbiie et al.
(2012). So survival rate of firms, 1 − δ is set to 0.975 to match the US job
destruction rate which is 0.10 per year. β is taken 0.99 to match annualized
4According to World Bank’s definitions: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications
5http : //www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFF inancialDevelopmentReport2011.pdf
6http : //www.oecd.org/countrieslist
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Figure 2.1: Firm Entry in UK and South Africa.
Data: World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey and Database
average interest rate, 0.04. θ is taken as 3.8 to fit US plant and macro trade
data. Frisch elasticity of labor, ϕ is taken as 4. The home bias parameter, ν
is calibrated as 0.755 matching the US data, and melting iceberg trade cost
τ and the deposit holding cost parameter, η, are taken as 1.33 and 0.0025,
respectively, as in Ghironi and Stebunovs (2010). We calibrated ψ arbitrarily,
and chose 0.10; producing firms need to borrow 10 percent of their labor costs
from banks.
To calibrate the lending cost part, we followed the model’s determination
of lending rates;
1 + qt =
(1+rt+1)(1+mt)
1−δ
For now ignore, (1− δ), which is actually some number close 1,
1 + qt ≈ (1 +mt)(1 + rt+1)
1 + qt ≈ 1 + rt+1 +mt + rt+1mt
With plausible calibration, we restrict mt to the interval 0-1, so the final
term rt+1mt will be some number close to 0. Ignoring this term;
mt ≈ qt − rt+1
This final equation demonstrates a way to calibrate lending cost part that
appears to be the premium. In our model, deposit holders take their return
without no risk. So risk free rate and deposit rate coincide in this model. We
will gather lending rates and risk-free treasury bills rates time series of US,
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UK and South Africa 7, differencing these two variables and then applying
HP Filter, we will estimate a multivariate process for lending costs. 8
The resulting process is;

gt
st
s∗t
 =

0.0039
0.0034
0.0074
+

0.55 0 0
0 0.33 0
0 0 0.64


gt−1
st−1
s∗t−1
+

ut
εt
ε∗t
 (2.22)
Here gt, global component stands for US, st is for UK and s
∗
t is for South
Africa. The off-diagonal elements in the matrix are taken as 0 since the null
hypotheses of being zero can not be rejected in the 5 percent level. One
may argue that, the t ratio tests are not compatible with VAR spirit, but
looking at impulse responses and Granger causality tests, we conclude at 95
percent confidence interval, the premiums only response to their own shocks.
So taking off-diagonal elements as 0 is acceptable and eases the analysis and
interpretation. 9
At steady state, home country (UK) has a lending cost of 1.3 percent
whereas foreign country (South Africa) has a lending cost of 2.9 percent.
Number of new entrants is 1.4 percent higher and number of producing firms
is 1.8 percent higher in home country compared to foreign country.
7Data is collected from IFS quarterly, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/
8Due to structural breaks experienced in US especially in 70s and in early 80s, as
Jermann and Quadrini (2009), we used quarterly data from 1984 first quarter to 2012 first
quarter. When modelling the premiums with VAR certain tests are made and it is shown
that premiums are best represented with a VAR(1) process.
9We are aware that identification of this VAR is indeed a problem, we want to extract
out identified shocks for US, UK and South Africa, however it does not seem to possible
with reduced form or restricted VAR. A different approach like, making a decomposition,
may be needed and left as a future work.
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2.2.3 Impulse Responses:
Productivity Shocks
First we present the implications of productivity shocks within our frame.
We fix lending costs to their steady state levels, treating them as param-
eters. For the structure of productivity shocks we follow the literature as
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) and impose persistent productivity process with-
out spillovers;
Zt
Z∗t
 =
0.95 0
0 0.95

Zt−1
Z∗t−1
+
ςt
ς∗t
 (2.23)
The residuals, ςt and ς
∗
t have the same variance of 0.7 percent and the
correlation of 0.3. Impulse responses are provided in the Appendix. 10
To look at the impulse responses, as well as second moments, we are al-
ways using logged and HP filtered variables that the model implies except for
current account, net exports, and deposit holdings. When there is an orthog-
onalized productivity shock in home country, we see that the real exchange
rate increases (that is one unit of foreign consumption basket corresponds
more of home consumption basket). Home country experiences both a cur-
rent account and net export surplus after an initial decline in the first period.
After nearly 30 periods of surplus, before returning to their steady state lev-
els, they become deficits, and then they finally go back to their steady state
level. Initially GDP increases in both countries, for the home country it never
falls below its steady state level until its returns back to steady state level.
However this is not the case for foreign country, initially it enjoys home coun-
try’s productivity shock, its GDP increases, but then it experience a fall on
the way to returning back to steady state level. Investment increases in both.
10Foreign country’s variables (in this case this is South Africa) are denoted with stars
for deposit holdings; B is for Bt, stB is for B
∗
t , Bst is for B∗,t and finally stBst is for B
∗
∗,t
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Wages, domestic prices, export prices, entry cost and the value of the firms
all increase in home country with productivity shock. Consumption, number
of producing firms, number of new entrants and labor employed increases
as well. Lending rate in home country initially increases but then decreases.
Similar to the lending rate, profits in the home country, increases initially but
after a few periods thry decline. This is mostly because of the increase in the
number of producers. All these variables behave exactly in the same way for
the foreign country too, except for labor supply, which in a way fluctuates;
initially increases then decreases but then slightly increases on its steady state
level again.
When there is orthogonalized productivity shock to foreign country, ex-
change rate decreases. The behaviors of current account, and net exports
are in the same way as home productivity shock. So the country that is
the source of shock experiences a current account surplus. The behaviour
of GDP is however not in the same way as home productivity shock. After
foreign country experiences a productivity shock the GDP of foreign country
increases, however GDP of home country decreases! Number of producing
firms, number of new entrants, labor supply and investment in the home
country decreases initially then after approximately 20 periods it increases
upon to its steady state level. Number of producing firms, number of new
entrants, labor supply and investment all increase in foreign country. Both
domestic and export prices increase in both countries. Value of firms, entry
cost, wages, and consumption increases in both countries. Dividends and
lending rate first increases, then decreases below its steady state level in both
countries.
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So we see that the impulse responses to symmetric productivity shock are
not symmetric; there are a few differences depending on whether the source
of country is financially developed (has lower lending cost) or less developed
(has higher lending cost).
Credit Shocks
The estimated VAR process gives the following residual covariance matrix:
Covariance Matrix ut εt ε
∗
t
ut 0.031 0.00379 0.00372
εt 0.029 -0.00032
ε∗t 0.094
To look at the impulse responses, since we are interested in orthogonalized
shocks and responses we prefer to give same amount of shock to both coun-
try specific error terms, equal to the variance of home country’s component
0.029; global component’s variance stays as given, 0.031. Covariance terms
are saved.
When there is an orthogonalized shock to εt, that is when shock comes
to financially developed (UK) country’s error term, exchange rate initially
increases then decreases. The home country experiences an initial current
account and net export surplus but then a deficit before returning to steady
state. Both the domestic and export prices fall in home country. domestic
prices increase in foreign country, however export prices first increases but
then decreases. The GDP of home country fall below its steady state level,
after a very small jump; that jump is mainly because of trade gains. Because
of the credit shock, prices fall and the increase in net exports causes an initial
jump in GDP. Foreign country enjoys an increase in GDP and until returning
back to steady state it never falls below its steady state level. Investment in
home country behaves just like GDP. Investment in foreign country initially
increases but after nearly 10 periods it falls below its long-run level.
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Wages, number of producing firms, entry cost, all fall in home country.
Wages and entry cost increase in foreign country. Labor supply, and number
of new entrants behave interestingly; they initially fall but after they increase
up to the their steady state level. Labor supply, number of producing firms
and number of new entrants initially increase however later they fall in foreign
country; a sign of contagion of crisis. Consumption behaves in the same way
as investment and GDP; it initially jumps but then falls in home country. The
behaviour of consumption is the same for foreign country. Profits at home
increase, mainly because of the decrease in producing firms. Value of firms on
the other hand initially increases but after a few periods they fall below their
steady state level. In foreign country profits falls and value of firms increase
initially. Profits increase after a few periods, value of firms turn back to its
steady state level after a slight fall.
The interpretation of an orthogonalized shock to ε∗t follows the same sense
of a shock to εt. So impulse responses are symmetric when there is a country
specific shock in world economy.
The orthogonalized shocks to ut makes similar effects to both countries.
Obviously the reason is the two countries are just symmetric except for their
lending cost. The shock increases lending cost, and the effect of the shock
outspreads with the channel of firms. At first both countries have a jump
GDP and investment but then they fall significantly, below their steady state
level. Number of firms, wages, prices, entry cost fall in both countries. For
both home and foreign country; number of new entrants and labor supply
initially decrease but then increase, consumption initially increases but then
decrease, profits and lending rate increase, value of firms first increase but
then decrease.
In the case of such an orthogonalized shock to ut we see different behav-
ior only in international variables. Exchange rate and net exports fluctuate
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significantly in the short term. Home country initially experiences a cur-
rent account deficit then it turns to a surplus. The reverse argument is
valid for foreign country. Relating this with latest financial crisis, which is
thought to be flared up in the last quarter of 2007 as Taylor (2009) states,
one may wonder how current account behaviour differed between high-income
and lower/middle income countries. World Bank provides annual current ac-
count data for country groups. Even though we do not have an aggregate
current account data quarterly, we can look at United Kingdom’s and South
Africa’s current account behaviours. Relevant graphs are provided in Figure
2.2, Figure 2.3. For the financially developed country (high-income country,
UK) indeed experiences an increase in current account after the last quarter
of 2007, that later decreases again. Looking at the country groups pattern
is same; high income countries first have decrease in their current accounts
from 2007 to 2008 and then this again turns into an increase. Behaviour of
middle and lower income countries is just symmetric.
Figure 2.2: Current Account in High Income vs. Middle and Lower Income
Countries.
Data: World Bank
So in the existence of global shock, we observe comovement across aggre-
gate real variables of both countries, however in the case of country specific
shocks we at most witness contagion. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) points out
that credit shocks enhance comovements across countries, in our model this
comovement is only possible with global credit shocks.
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Figure 2.3: Current Account in UK and South Africa.
Data: International Financial Statistics
2.2.4 International Business Cycles and Second Mo-
ments:
For comparison, we present both second moments from productivity shocks
and credit shocks. To compare the second moments with real data, all vari-
ables are in logarithms, detrended with HP fiter, except for net exports and
current accounts. Relative standard deviations for productivity shocks and
two versions of credit shocks are presented in Table 2.2. We look at rela-
tive volatilities, since we are using US parameters, and UK and South Africa
lending cost processes, it would not be appropriate to make inferences and
comparison with the real data of these countries.
Productivity Shocks
In the case of productivity shocks, both countries’ variables have very close
standard deviations. Consumption is less volatile than GDP. Investment is
more volatile than GDP. Both imports and exports are more volatile than
GDP. These are in accordance with what the international business cycle
literature suggests (see Auray and Eyquem (2011) and Farhat (2010)). Plus,
as the mentioned literature in Section 1 expects, the number of new entrants is
more volatile than the number of producing firms in both countries. However
in this set-up, contradicting with literature, labor supply is more volatile than
GDP, and real exchange rate is less volatile than GDP.
If we look at the cross correlations for the variables, we again would see
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same patterns in both countries. The correlations between exports/imports
and GDP are positive. Contrary to the data at hand,the correlation between
imports and GDP is not higher than the one between exports and GDP and
the correlation between net exports and GDP is not negative. Exchange rate
is positively correlated with exports and negatively correlated with imports.
Cross country correlation of consumptions is higher than cross country cor-
relation of outputs. So the model with productivity shocks does not reflect
the so called consumption-output anomaly (the situation seen in the real
world data that cross country correlation of consumptions is less than the
correlation of outputs).
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) shows that the correlation between consump-
tion and GDP, and the correlation between investment and GDP are higher
in emerging economies compared to developed countries. Putting, financially
developed country to developed class, and less financially developed country
to emerging class, we can make a comparison in this sense. When cycles are
driven by productivity shocks two countries do not differ with respect to this
correlations.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) also document business cycle differences be-
tween emerging economies and developed countries. They present the fact
that relative volatilities of real variables are significantly higher for emerg-
ing countries compared to developed ones. In accordance with Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007), Buch et al. (2005) points out empirically that countries
with more developed financial systems have lower business cycle volatility.
With productivity shocks, foreign country’s GDP is slightly more volatile.
However consumption, investment and lending rate in foreign country (finan-
cially less developed country) are not more volatile than the consumption,
investment and lending rate in home country (financially developed country).
The standard deviations of new entrants are nearly same in both countries,
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σF/σH Productivity Shocks Credit Shocks* Credit Shocks**
σGDP ∗/σGDP 1.006 1.125 1.628
σINV ∗/σINV 0.997 1.178 1.714
σρ∗D/σρD 1.006 1.204 1.688
σEX∗/σEX 1.042 1.004 1.184
σIM∗/σIM 0.954 0.994 0.801
σNX∗/σNX 1.002 1.002 1.002
σN∗/σN 0.997 1.195 1.782
σv∗/σv 1.000 1.035 1.422
σq∗/σq 0.769 1.208 1.838
σH∗/σH 1.000 1.204 1.688
σN∗E/σNE 1.000 0.996 1.444
σd∗/σd 1.002 1.086 1.507
σC∗/σC 0.997 1.010 1.383
σL∗/σL 0.992 0.974 1.379
σr∗/σr 1.001 0.856 1.138
σw∗/σw 1.006 1.204 1.688
Note: Credit Shocks* denotes the set-up where we made country-specific er-
ror term variances same; for Credir Shock**, it is the real variance-covariance
matrix.
Table 2.2: Relative Standard Deviations
while the model estimates the volatility of producing firms in home country
is higher than the one in foreign country.
Credit Shocks
To compare second moments, with credit shocks, we make two experi-
ments. First we impose exactly what the covariance matrix implies. Second
we will change the variance of ε∗t and put the restriction of both country
specific error terms have the same variance. We do second experiment to see
what would happen if the two countries experience exactly same credit shocks
plus a global shock, preserving covariances. This is to eliminate the fact that
historically, lending cost in South Africa has indeed very large variance; which
can effect resulting moments significantly.
When there are credit shocks, either with same variances or with the real
covariance matrix, we see the same patterns in terms of individual variables’
volatilities, as productivity shocks. With credit shocks however, the differ-
ences in the mentioned variables’ moments are much more apparent, more
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close what the data suggests. For the correlations again we match the same
set of business cycle facts. One difference is in the real covariance version for
the foreign country imports and GDP are not positively correlated. When we
impose same variances, this correlation becomes negative for home country
too. With credit shocks, in both versions, correlation between consumption
and GDP, and the correlation between investment and GDP are higher in
foreign country.
Credit shocks also reflect better the fact that less financially developed
country has more volatile business cycle. Not only the GDP but also con-
sumption, investment and lending rate in foreign country are now more
volatile compared to home country. This is compatible what Garcia-Cicco
et al. (2010) suggest; with productivity shocks real business cycle models
fail to show high volatility of financially less developed (emerging) countries.
However, in the case of credit shocks (or shocks coming from financial fric-
tions like country premium shocks in their paper) reveal mentioned higher
volatility.
The version that has real covariance matrix estimates the volatility of
producing firms and new entrants to be higher in the foreign country. When
we make the variance of two country specific components’ error terms same,
volatility of new entrants is now lower in foreign country, whereas volatility
of producing firms higher in foreign country. So this version is the most close
one to the pattern we witness in the financial crisis. If we give only global
shock and cancel out the country-specific shocks, both the producing firms
and new entrants in home country become more volatile than those in foreign
country.
In accordance with arguments of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Buch
et al. (2005); in our all three versions volatility of business cycle of foreign
country is higher. However when there is productivity shocks, the volatility
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of variables in foreign country are just slightly higher compared to those
in home country. In the existence of credit shocks the difference is more
apparent. When we make same the variances of country specific shocks, we
further cover the fact of different volatilities of new entrants.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION
To conclude, this paper has built a DSGE model embracing certain empir-
ical facts about finance differences in new entrants and older firms. Solving
the model both with productivity and credit shocks we show that both shocks
are able to match a set of business cycle statistics. Different than productiv-
ity shocks, credit shocks also reveals the fact that financially less developed
countries have more volatile business cycles compared to financially developed
ones. Plus, when business cycles are driven by credit shocks, the model also
exhibits the empirical fact that financially less developed countries have more
correlated consumption and GDP and also more correlated investment and
GDP compared to the financially developed ones. If we restrict the model
to work with only global shocks, or specify equal country-specific shocks, the
model also matches higher volatility of firm entry in high-income (financially)
developed countries. However we doubt that this is a long-term business cycle
fact; because imposing the shocks as the real data suggests the volatility of
new entrants also seem to be higher in less financially developed countries.
This is mainly because of the fact that, historically these countries face credit
shocks that have larger variances.
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In our set-up responses to productivity shocks are not symmetric. When
there is positive shock to either country, both countries increase their con-
sumption.When the source of the productivity shock is home country, ag-
gregate variables’ in foreign country behave exactly same as corresponding
aggregate variables in home country. However when the source of the pro-
ductivity shock is foreign country this is not the case. In such a case, the GDP
of home country decreases! Investment, number of producing firms, number
of new entrants and labour first fall below their steady state level but then
increase. Responses to country-specific credit shocks, on the other hand,
are symmetric and we see the contagion of country-specific crisis after some
periods, in variables, consumption, investment, labour supply, number of pro-
ducing firms and new entrants. If the credit shock is not country-specific but
instead global then we observe a synchronized recession. While both countries
have decline in their consumption and output, financially developed country
initially experiences a current account deficit which later turns to a surplus.
For the less financially developed country the reverse argument is valid.
One important point is that, we modelled the lending costs of both coun-
tries as if both of them absorbs all of the global shock. Another way to model
lending cost would be to constrain global components’ effect with financial
openness of the country. We may change monitoring cost of home country
as mt = e
st − λe−gt where, λ indicates the country’s vulnerability to global
shocks. Or modelling monitoring cost in a different functional form may let
more interaction between global and country-specific terms.
We estimated credit shock processes using representative countries for
high income and middle income country groups. However correct approach
may require a detailed econometric work on mentioned groups and estimat-
ing a multivariate process using all available countries’ information. This
applications are left as future works.
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An important drawback is we restricted firms’ borrowing decisions; did
not let them making their own finance choice. Because of this reason stock
market finance and bank finance are not substitutes in our set-up. Solving this
problem, probably with the enforcement constraint formulation that Jermann
and Quadrini (2009) suggest, may improve the model and also make it able
to explain the behaviour of financial variables.
Nevertheless, the model has set-up a frame of business cycle model where
shocks manage the cycle via the channel of firm finance. Model’s comparison
between productivity shocks and credit shocks provides a different perspective
on international business cycles.
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APPENDIX
A. Model Summary
Table 3.1: Model Summary
Equation
Pricing ρD,t =
θ
θ−1
wt
Zt
ρ∗D,t =
θ
θ−1
w∗t
Z∗t
ρX,t = Q
−1
t τtρD,t
ρ∗X,t = Qtτ
∗
t ρ
∗
D,t
Price Indexes
(
νNt(ρD,t)
1−θ + (1− ν)N∗t (ρX,t)1−θ
)
= 1(
νN∗t (ρ
∗
D,t)
1−θ + (1− ν)Nt(ρX,t)1−θ
)
= 1
Profits dt = dt = νCt
1
θ
ρ1−θD,t +
Qt
θ
(1− ν)C∗t ρ1−θX,t
d∗t = νC
∗
t
1
θ
ρ∗1−θD,t +
1
Qtθ
(1− ν)Ctρ∗1−θX,t
Free entry Et(dt+1 + vt+1) = (1 + qt)Ht
Et(d
∗
t+1 + v
∗
t+1) = (1 + q
∗
t )H
∗
t
Number of Firms Nt = (Nt−1 +NE,t−1)(1− δ)
N∗t = (N
∗
t−1 +N
∗
E,t−1)(1− δ)
Intratemporal Optimality χL
1/ϕ
t =
wt
Ct
χL
∗1/ϕ
t =
w∗t
C∗t
Euler Eqn (domestic deposits) C−1t (1 + ηBt+1) =
β(1 + rt+1)Et
[
C−1t+1
]
(C∗t )
−1(1 + ηB∗∗,t+1) =
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued
Equation
β(1 + r∗t+1)Et
[
C∗−1t+1
]
Euler Eqn (foreign deposits) C−1t (1 + ηB∗,t+1) = β(1 + r
∗
t+1)
Et
[
Qt+1
Qt
C−1t+1
]
(C∗t )
−1(1 + ηB∗t+1) = β(1 + rt+1)
Et
[
Qt
Qt+1
C∗−1t+1
]
Euler Equation (shares) vt = Et(β(1− δ)(Ct+1Ct )−1 (dt+1 + vt+1−
ψ(θ − 1)(1 + qt)dt))
v∗t = Et(β(1− δ)(C
∗
t+1
C∗t
)−1
(
d∗t+1 + v
∗
t+1−
ψ(θ − 1)(1 + q∗t )d∗t ))
Sunk Entry Cost Ht = fE,t
wt
Zt
H∗t = fE,t
w∗t
Z∗t
Bank’s interest on entry loans 1 + qt =
(1+rt+1)(1+mt)
1−δ
1 + q∗t =
(1+r∗t+1)(1+m
∗
t )
1−δ
Labor market equilibrium L = Nt
wt
(θ − 1)(ν 1
θ
(ρ1−θD )Ct+
(1− ν)1
θ
(ρ1−θX,t )C
∗
tQt) +NE,t
fe
Z
L∗ = N
∗
t
w∗t
(θ − 1)(ν 1
θ
(ρ∗1−θD )C
∗
t +
(1− ν)1
θ
(ρ∗1−θX,t )Ct
1
Qt
) +N∗E,t
fe
Z
Bond market equilibrium Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1 = (1 +mt)(HtNE,t
+ψ(θ − 1)dtNt)
B∗,t+1 +B∗∗,t+1 = (1 +m
∗
t )(H
∗
tN
∗
E,t
+ψ(θ − 1)d∗tN∗t )
Law of net foreign assets . QtB∗,t+1 −B∗t+1 = Qt(1 + r∗t )B∗,t−
(1 + rt)B
∗
t − (1/2)((1 +mt)(HtNE,t
+ψ(θ − 1)Ntdt)−Qt(1 +m∗t )
(H∗tN
∗
E,t + ψ(θ − 1)N∗t d∗t ))
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued
Equation
. −(1/2)(vtNt −Qtv∗tN∗t ))
−(1/2)(Ct −QtC∗t
+(1/2)((1 + rt)(1 +mt−1)(Ht−1NE,t−1
. +ψ(θ − 1)Nt−1dt−1)−Qt(1 + r∗t )
(1 +m∗t−1)(H
∗
t−1N
∗
E,t−1 + ψ(θ − 1)N∗t−1
. d∗t−1)) + (1/2)(wtLt −Qtw∗tL∗t )
+(1/2)(Nt−1(1− δ)(dt + vt − ψ(θ − 1)
. (1 + qt−1)dt−1)−QtN∗t−1(1− δ)(d∗t
. +v∗t − ψ(θ − 1)(1 + q∗t−1)d∗t−1))
Monitoring Cost mt = (e
st − e−gt)
m∗t = (e
s∗t − e−gt)
Country-Specific Component st = sd + κst−1 + εt
s∗t = s
∗
d + κ
∗s∗t−1 + ε
∗
t
Global Component gt = gd + γgt−1 + ut
46
B. Steady State
Steady state risk free interest rate and lending rate;
r = 1−β
β
(1 + q) = (1+r)(1+m)
(1−δ)
Now, define κ and Φ as follows;
κ = (1+q)(r+δ)
z((r+δ)+(1−δ)(1−ψ(θ−1)(1+q)))
Φ = κ
[
θ(ν+(1−ν)τ1−θ)
ν+(1−ν)τ − (1−δ)(1−ψ(1+q)(θ−1))rr+δ − r(1+m)(fEδ+ψ(θ−1)z(1−δ))z(1−δ)
]
Number of producing firms at steady state;
N =
[
(ν+(1−ν)τ)
(ν+(1−ν)τ1−θ)Φϕ κ θ χ
] ϕ
1+ϕ
Number of new entrants;
NE,t =
δ
1−δN
Labor supply;
L = ΦN
Real wages;
w = (θ−1)zN
1
θ−1
θ(ν+(1+ν)τ1−θ)
1
1−θ
Prices;
ρD =
(
N
(
ν + τ 1−θ (1− ν))) 1θ−1
ρX = τρD
Deposit Holdings;
B = (1 +m)Nw( fEδ
z(1−δ) + ψ(θ − 1)κ)
Consumption;
C = κθw
(ν+(1+ν)τ)ρ1−θD
Dividends (Profits);
d = κw
Value of a firm;
v = (1−δ)(1−ψ(1+q)(θ−1))
r+δ
d
The Amount that new entrants should borrow from banks;
H = fE w
z
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C. Impulse Responses
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Figure 3.1: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ςt
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Figure 3.3: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ςt
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Figure 3.4: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ςt
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Figure 3.5: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ς∗t
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Figure 3.6: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ς∗t
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Figure 3.7: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ς∗t
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Figure 3.8: Responses to an orthogonalized productivity shock in ς∗t
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Figure 3.9: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in εt
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Figure 3.10: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in εt
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Figure 3.11: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in εt
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Figure 3.12: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in εt
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Figure 3.13: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in εt
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Figure 3.14: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ε∗t
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Figure 3.15: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ε∗t
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Figure 3.16: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ε∗t
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Figure 3.17: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ε∗t
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Figure 3.18: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ε∗t
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Figure 3.19: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ut
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Figure 3.20: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ut
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Figure 3.21: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ut
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Figure 3.22: Responses to an orthogonalized credit shock in ut
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